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ABSTRACT: Corruption has been a major concern worldwide for decades. In response, Brazil and many 
other countries have set up agencies focused on corruption control, oversight and prevention. In this 
study, we seek to analyze the actions and responsibilities of the Brazilian Office of the Comptroller 
General (CGU), established in 2003, and to develop an extension of current policy to enhance ex ante 
corruption and mismanagement control. The idea presented herein includes increasing the probability of a 
municipality being selected for an audit during a mayor’s term, thus assuring that every local executive 
authority will be investigated at least once during its mandate. We develop a theoretical model of 
strategic interaction between the mayor and the Office of the Comptroller General, highlighting the 
factors that condition the mayor’s choices, and conducting a cost-benefit analysis concerning CGU’s 
policy decisions.  A novel database based on audit reports for health transfers is drawn upon for 
illustration of players’ response to the current levels of parameters.  
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RESUMO: A corrupção tem sido uma preocupação mundial por décadas. Em resposta, o Brasil e vários 
outros países criaram agencias focadas na prevenção e no combate à corrupção. Neste estudo, buscamos 
analisar as ações e as responsabilidades da Controladoria Geral da União, criada em 2003, e desenvolver 
uma extensão da atual política de controle e supervisão para aumentar o controle antecipado da 
corrupção. A idéia aqui apresentada contempla aumentar a probabilidade de um município ser 
selecionado para uma auditoria durante a gestão de um prefeito, assegurando que toda autoridade 
executiva local seja investigada ao menos uma vez durante um mandato. Desenvolvemos um modelo 
teórico de interação entre o prefeito e a Controladoria Geral da União, destacando os fatores que 
condicionam as escolhas do prefeito, e conduzindo uma análise de custo-beneficio das decisões de 
políticas públicas da CGU. Uma base de dados inédita, construída a partir dos relatórios de fiscalização 
para as transferências oriundas do Ministério da Saúde, é utilizada para ilustrar a resposta dos jogadores 
aos níveis atuais dos parâmetros. 
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    1  1.  Introduction 
 
  As with a number of other developing nations, Brazil has recently
1 been struck by a slew of 
corruption scandals. The Brazilian episodes have involved civil servants, government officials, 
politicians, private-sector companies, employers and employees, and members of civil society. As is 
widely known, “corruption is a widespread phenomenon which undermines good governance, erodes the 
rule of law, hampers economic growth and efforts for poverty reduction and distorts competitive 
conditions in business transactions” (OCDE, 2000: 2). This certainly holds true in the case of Brazil. 
  Yet, what has been done so far? Not much. Brazil has created a few agencies meant to fight 
corruption, and developed control and oversight agencies that operate with relative efficiently. However, 
few initiatives have proven to be effective for actual deterrence.   
  Some agencies date back to the 19
th Century, such as the Tribunal de Contas da Uniao (Federal 
Audit Court) and several sub-national equivalents have been established during the first half of the 20
th 
century. Today, all states and two municipalities (which ones?) have audit courts. Others have been 
created more recently (such as the Office of the Comptroller General, the focus of this study). 
  As such, how can transparency improve and corruption be more effectively prevented, given that 
the existing agencies are, at least theoretically, independent and exhaustive in terms of jurisdiction? 
  This paper seeks both to analyze the random-audit programs established by the Office of the 
Comptroller General (Controladoria Geral da Uniao or CGU) in Brazil and to suggest an extension of 
the existing model, in order to enhance ex ante control and consequent prevention of corruption.  
  Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that corruption always goes hand-in-hand with wasting 
resources. Contrary to one branch of the literature (Leff, 1964; Hutington, 1968) that believes that the 
optimal level of corruption is positive due to the alleged similarity of its effects on production with 
respect to taxation, the authors link the bureaucracy’s need for secrecy concerning misappropriation of 
funds to the emergence of inefficient allocative results. In particular, funds are channeled to rent-seeking 
activities with a low likelihood of being uncovered by the principal, due to the typical agency problem
2 in 
question. 
  In light of this, efforts to deter misappropriation of funds have a direct relationship with an 
increase in efficiency when managing funds. In fact, the Office of the Comptroller General’s oversight 
program for states and municipalities, as we shall see below, is the first attempt to monitor funds whose 
transfer has been governed by legislation since 1988. A more thorough understanding of the incentives 
underlying the oversight’s enforcement mechanisms is fundamental for fine tuning policy and 
minimizing wasted federal revenue, with virtuous effects for the provision of public goods at all levels of 
government. 
  Given that Brazil is a highly decentralized country, with more than one-third of public 
expenditures made at the sub-national level, since promulgation of the 1988 Federal Constitution, 
municipalities have acquired greater responsibility in terms of providing public services locally. Thus, we 
decided to focus on municipal oversight. Another reason for this choice relates to a novel database with 
audit-reports data for health transfers at the municipality level, which shall present new grounds for 
empirical efforts in order to qualify corruption determinants and policy effectiveness, used in this paper 
as an illustration of players’ response to current parameter values, in terms of the theoretical model 
developed herein. In any event, results drawn in further sections should theoretically hold for state-level 
oversight as well.  
  In the next section, we present a review of how anticorruption strategies are implemented around 
the world, exploring similarities and dissimilarities with the Brazilian case. Section three details the 
structure of the Office of the Comptroller General in Brazil, and section four explores the random-audit 
program and a proposed extension thereof through an interaction model between mayors and the Office 
of the Comptroller General. Section five discusses the main results of the proposed extended model. 
                                                 
1 Since the beginning of the 1990s. 
2 On the agent-principal approach to the corruption issue, see Becker and Stigler (1974). 
 
    2  Section six reviews the topics presented throughout the article in greater detail, focusing on evidence for 
health-related funds audited in Brazilian municipalities, based on reports produced by the CGU between 
2001 and 2004. The main conclusions are reported in the final section. 
 
2.  Anticorruption strategies around the world   
 
2.1.1.  Anticorruption agencies 
 
  In recent years, multilateral organizations have demonstrated growing concern for corruption-
related issues in the development of aid programs for low-income countries in order to establish 
anticorruption initiatives. Two such examples are the OECD and the UNDP, which fund numerous 
country-specific anticorruption programs.  
  Upon analyzing a number of programs adopted around the world, we identified a strong trend for 
creating anticorruption agencies associated with high-level audit institutions. However, it is important to 
keep in mind that since corruption patterns vary through space and time, each country must develop its 
own anticorruption strategies.  
  According to Pope (1999), 
  
“to operate successfully, an anti-corruption agency must possess the following: [a.)] 
committed political backing at the highest levels of government; [b.)] political and 
operational independence to investigate…. [c.)] adequate powers of access to 
documentation and to question witnesses; and, leadership which is seen as being of the 
highest integrity” (Pope, 1999: 1). 
  
2.1.2.  Random audit programs 
 
  Implementation of random-audit programs by national revenue services is widespread, although 
they serve varying purposes. 
The Internal Revenue Service in the United States established a random-audit program for 
taxpayers in the early 1990s. It currently has plans to revive the practice, randomly auditing taxpayers in 
order to improve the mechanisms against tax-dodging. Even though the purpose is not the same as ours 
(local governments versus taxpayers), it is still interesting to understand its aims.  
The use of random audits in the U.S. has a specific goal: to calibrate the Discriminant Inventory 
Function System software used by the IRS to assign scores to individual returns based on the likelihood 
that an audit will lead to a tax change, and to improve audit-selection techniques. The IRS’ random audits 
aim at sampling 13,000 taxpayers out of 136 million, a selection probability of just 0.0096%. 
  While this selection probability may seem tiny, it should not be read this way – the purpose of the 
IRS is to ameliorate its audit techniques, rather to gain a good picture of taxpayers throughout the U.S. 
On the other hand, the idea of anti-corruption random audit programs is either to obtain a representative 
portion of the entire universe or to investigate the greatest number of entities possible. 
  
2.1.3.  The Office of the Comptroller General in Brazil 
 
  In Brazil, the Office of the Comptroller General (CGU) is responsible for assisting the President 
with issues related to the defense of public assets and transparency of public management, through 
internal control, public auditing, corrections, corruption prevention/fighting, and an ombudsman office. It 
is also responsible for technical supervision of the entities that comprise both the Internal Control System 
and Correction System, providing normative guidance when needed.  
The CGU was created on April 2, 2001, with the mission to investigate and fight fraud and 
corruption, and to protect public assets. With the promulgation of Federal Decree 5683, on January 24, 
2006, the CGU became not only a control and audit agency, but also a corruption-prevention entity, 
    3  developing expedients to deter corruption ex ante. Decree 5683 delegated greater powers to the CGU by 
creating the Bureau of Corruption Prevention and Strategic Information. 
After promulgation of Federal Decree 5683 (complementing Federal Constitutional Amendment 
2.143-21/2001, Federal Decree 4.177/2002 and Federal Law 10.683/2003), the CGU’s main functions 
were consolidated under the same operational structure. 
According to Federal Law 10.683, from May 28, 2003, the CGU assists the Executive Branch in 
defending public property, promoting internal control, performing public audits, assuring correction, 
preventing and combating corruption, providing ombudsman services, and increasing transparency in 
government actions at the federal level. 
The CGU is an executive agency designed to perform audits and control initiatives to verify the 
uses of public funding. This power is exerted by the Federal Secretariat for Internal Control (SFCI), 
responsible for evaluating execution of the federal budget, supervising implementation of government 
programs, and auditing federal funds transferred to other public or private entities at other administrative 
levels. It is also in charge of oversight and fraud detection in every issue related to public funds. It is 
responsible for developing mechanisms to prevent corruption, anticipating its action in corruption-related 
episodes through the SFCI. Since the creation of the Secretariat, established as an intelligence unit, the 
development of prevention initiatives has become a recursive issue, and this study seeks to contribute to 
this discussion. 
 
2.1.4.  The random audit program in Brazil 
 
  Given that the random-audit program is ran by a de facto national anticorruption agency (i.e. the 
CGU), some may view it as a politicized tool, and thus ineffective for preventing corruption. However, a 
mechanism for selecting states and municipalities to be audited completely eliminates this possibility. 
The initiative of making random selections through a national lottery has eliminated political influence 
over eligible counties, giving the transparency needed for an anticorruption program to be credible. 
The random-audit program was first established in 2003 for municipalities, and in 2004 for states. 
Analyzing the drawings done to date, it seems plausible to conclude that the CGU’s focus is to oversee 
municipalities, given that 23 drawings, involving over 1,200 municipalities, have already taken place for 
local-level administrations.
3 The program was started in 2003 with a sample of five municipalities in the 
first random selection. The second program included 25 municipalities. From the third to the twelfth, 50 
municipalities were drawn, and from the thirteenth on, 60 municipalities are now drawn on a bimonthly 
basis.  
The municipal audit program investigates all federal transfers to municipalities: transfers 
earmarked to execute national health and education policies (legal transfers); direct transfers to citizens; 
and politically negotiated (voluntary) transfers. 
  The selection process was properly designed so that the samples would be geographically 
representative
4, and selection probabilities are currently around one percent for each of the 5,560 
municipalities in the Federative Republic of Brazil
5, while complying with a population threshold 
currently set at a maximum of 500,000 inhabitants for the city to be eligible. 
 
3.  Interaction model 
  
  In the section above, we explained the structure of the domestic oversight system in detail, 
starting with its agencies, coverage and powers. This overview is relevant as a foundation of the CGU’s 
underlying role, the complementarities and substitutions among different agents in the system, defining 
the initial conditions for interaction between the CGU and municipalities, about which we are particularly 
concerned. 
                                                 
3 Five drawings have selected states in 2004, 2005 and 2006. However, control actions are focused on specific areas due to the 
territorial extension of these sub-national governments. 
4 Please see the appendix for the number of municipalities selected from each state. 
5 This makes the overall probability of selection converge to 1%, or more precisely, 1.079%. 
    4    Even though the CGU oversees both states and municipalities, we have focused more on the latter 
due to particular interest in the influence of institutions and enforcement mechanisms on local economic 
development, which is fundamentally conceived based on policies formulated at the municipal level. 
Despite the local scope of these policies, their sources of financing often include funding that does not 
originate from municipal tax collection. Instead, they are transferred by the federal government either as 
voluntary or constitutional transfers that may be earmarked or not. 
  As of the 1988 Constitution, the system of vertical transfers initiated by the reforms of 1962-67 
became a legal reality, corroborating the federalist character of the Constitution in terms of transferring 
funds and responsibilities to states and municipalities. 
  If on the one hand funding was now being transferred to subnational levels, with allocation of 
respective responsibilities, then on the other hand, the lack of enforcement mechanisms to guarantee 
investment of earmarked money in accordance with the objectives specified for each program raised 
doubts over the relative efficiency of this institutional arrangement. The incentives for misappropriation 
of funds and allocation of social funding to rent-seeking activities were directly associated with the 
distortion of engaging in productive activities, as well as a contraction to the supply of public goods, with 
direct impacts on social well-being. 
  In response to this perverse dynamic, an oversight program was set up in 2002 using public 
lotteries, seeking to provide special oversight of federal public funds invested through federal-
administrative agencies either directly or through transfers of any kind to state or municipal 
administrative agencies, and to any other legally qualified agencies or entities.
6 
  Within a contract theory framework, if definition of transfer systems in the Constitution of 1988 
occurred without creation of the respective enforcement mechanisms capable of limiting the moral hazard 
associated with the mayors’ unobservable actions – whose interests are not necessarily aligned with those 
of the federal government – then room was created for the emergence of a conflict inherent to agent-
principal interaction. Renegotiation was fostered. 
  Contracts are intrinsically incomplete in a scenario of limited rationality, opportunism and 
transactions costs. In order to restrict the possibility of contingencies associated with events unforeseen 
by contractual terms, it is rational for the principal to introduce mechanisms to promote the alignment of 
incentives between the former and the agent. In the case in question, the establishment of an oversight 
program creates a monitoring mechanism that is able to limit the opportunistic behavior of municipal 
managers, to a greater or lesser extent, in the appropriation of funds transferred by the federal 
government and earmarked for specific objectives. 
  In this section, we present a model for strategic interaction between the CGU and mayors, 
specifying a full set of strategies and payoffs. From this characterization, we then discuss the optimal 
responses of each player based on his choices. We solve the game using certain simplifying assumptions 
to derive conclusions regarding the guidelines of public policies that might maximize the efficiency of the 
CGU’s actions, limiting the opportunistic behavior of mayors while saving funds allocated to monitoring 
activities. 
  Inspiration for specification of the strategies available in this model comes from reading the 
complete inspection reports on federal transfers to municipalities reported to the Ministry of Health, as 









                                                 
6 For the more recent, detailed information, please visit the CGU’s website at: 
http://www.cgu.gov.br/AreaAuditoriaFiscalizacao/ExecucaoProgramasGoverno/Sorteios/index.asp  












































  The game in Figure 1 schematically describes the sequence of interaction between the mayor M 
and the CGU during one term. At first, the mayor decides whether to engage in corrupt (C) or not corrupt 
(NC) behavior. If he chooses not corrupt, then he must also choose between good administration (BA, or 
GA in the dynamic optimization model) or mismanagement (MA), based on the CGU’s criteria, which is 
more fully discussed below. 
  Even if one may argue that the decision for corrupt management occurs constantly throughout a 
term, or alternatively, that the decision between good and mismanagement does not belong in the mayor’s 
realm of choices – given that a certain degree of uncertainty would remain – this model is still interesting, 
    6  because it focuses on the moral hazard of the mayor acting in breach of legal provisions regarding the 
appropriation of earmarked funds from the transfer program. If cases can actually be defined in which the 
mayor behaves this way due to ignorance or error, then it makes sense to imagine that through a process 
of natural selection, this type of behavior would disappear as the CGU produced arguments for its 
credibility function, as specified below. 
 Additionally,  representing the decision to be corrupt in this way is interesting from a public-policy 
analysis standpoint that seeks to discover the alternative pursued by the public power, which cannot be a 
“lesser degree” of embezzlement, but its elimination. In terms of the choice between good and 
mismanagement, in addition to the argument regarding selective elimination of the action due to 
ignorance or error, one may also argue that these strategies belong to the mayor’s realm of choices due to 
a very specific definition of mismanagement used in the CGU’s oversight reports. Given that the analysis 
conducted by the auditors does not include any consideration of assessment of the policy’s performance, 
limiting itself to finding whether the appropriation of funds takes places for the purposes and in the way 
duly set out by legal prescriptions, it is possible to define mismanagement basically in terms of legal or 
administrative provisions directly chosen by the manager. 
  This is exemplified in Biderman et alli (2007), with the typology of irregularities encountered by 
the audits, prepared for the study on corruption at the Ministry of Health in Brazil, classified in general 
terms as mismanagement. 
  Except for one category
7, which can only be indirectly attributed to a decision by the mayor, all of 
the other categories belong directly within the manager’s realm of choices. If the mayor is not personally 
involved in every decision, then at least selection of the managers in charge and the decision of whether 
to keep them in those positions based on their performance of the delegated choices are within the 
mayor’s power. Once eliminating the possibility of incurring these irregularities due to ignorance or 
error, we assume that the new agent-principal problem between mayor and secretaries, for instance, is 
equivalently settled by a monitoring mechanism (creating incentives for the mayor to develop his own 
instruments to limit the opportunism of secretaries, since the discovery of an irregularity by the CGU 
would directly affect him). 
  Thus, once a mayor has made his initial choices, the CGU gets involved in the interaction. The 
strategies available have to be dealt with carefully, given that they result from probabilities defined 
exogenously to the model. First, there is the likelihood of a municipality being selected throughout the 
term. Given that lotteries are done every two months; that the probability of a municipality being drawn 
in its state is around 1%; and that one percent of the state’s municipalities is selected, with a grace period 
of two months for replacement (Zamboni and Litschig, 2006), the likelihood of a municipality being 
chosen during a term is around 21.82%
8.  
  It is clear that this likelihood is a choice variable of the CGU that is outside of the model. Another 
probability associated with the CGU’s actions is defined, though, as the chance of being discovered, such 
that the municipality need only be selected for any irregularities to be exposed. The next step depends on 
training the team of auditors, the amount of funds allocated to monitoring activities, among other factors 
that exogenously determine to a greater or lesser degree this likelihood as a function of parameters that 
belong to the CGU’s realm of choices. 
  Thus, three possible outcomes are presented for the municipality at each point in which the CGU 
is called into play, defined by their nature, since the likelihood of being drawn and discovered are defined 
as: (i) not being drawn; (ii) being drawn, having irregularities, but not being discovered; and; (iii) being 
drawn, having irregularities and being discovered. With respect to the first two cases, the interaction 
terminates there, and the payoffs are realized. In the last case, though, it is possible for the mayor to 
appeal the CGU’s report – which in auditing reports is referred to as presenting justifications – and if it 
opts to appeal, this justification may or may not be accepted by the CGU. 
  Even though this last stage of interaction after discovering irregularities is able to reflect reality 
more closely, if specified in stochastic terms, we are not especially interested in changing the incentives 
                                                 
7 The category is “poor customer service”. Details, not shown, are available upon request. 
8      
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P selection  1  –   0,0102    1  –  0,7818   0,2182  
    7  for the mayor to present a justification, since the right to a fair defense is a constitutional prerogative. 
Thus we limit the decision between appealing or not, and accepting or not, to a simple cost-benefit 
analysis in which the counterparts face the marginal costs of filing a formal suit or gathering additional 
evidence. 
  From this, in all cases in which the mayor is not selected, gains or losses of reputation are not 
determined; if the mayor opts for good administration, there is no change to the base payoff. If he opts for 
mismanagement, he appropriates the gains of more flexible management, and, in the event of corruption, 
he appropriates the amount embezzled. As a function of the gains and losses that we associate with MA, 
it is important to emphasize that we adopt an even more restrictive definition of this practice in order for 
it to have impacts solely on the credibility of the inspected agencies, on the one hand, and managerial 
savings for the mayor, on the other, without directly resulting in social losses (even indirectly, since less 
credibility of the CGU will have first-order impacts on the mayor’s choice between being corrupt or not). 
  If the mayor is selected, but the CGU fails to find any irregularities, added to the payoffs 
discussed above is a gain of positive reputation – since this is the same as the CGU not having found any 
irregularity, as if every administration in this condition had chosen good management. If the CGU is 
successful in its discovery, though, then only those mayors who have chosen good administration 
immediately reap the gains of reputation, while those in the other branches of the tree may do so after 
appealing, if the CGU accepts their justification (but not without incurring costs cR) or alternatively, 
suffering losses of reputation, as well as requiring misappropriated funds to be returned in the event of 
corruption, given that it does not appeal or has its justification denied. 
  For the CGU, on the other hand, being successful in the investigation of every type of 
management is related to variations of credibility. The cumulative credibility function will have a direct 
effect on the mayor’s decision, since he does not observe the actual likelihood of being discovered (π). In 
the event of corruption, if he commits a type-I mistake (rejecting, when he should accept the assumption 
of corruption), losses are amplified, as a result of the implications of lack of enforcement from 
institutions that assure property rights, with impacts in the literature (Shirley, 2005) on economic results 
and social well being. 
  Since the CGU does not observe the choices that the mayor makes at the outset, the interaction is 
equivalent to a simultaneous game expressed strategically as: 
 






















    8  in which πobs is the cumulative credibility function of the CGU as specified below. 


















  It is clear that in the case of mismanagement, it is possible that it may not be worth it for the CGU 
to pay the costs of additional investigation in order to reject a mayor’s justification, establishing a critical 
relationship between the parameters for determining choice. In each case, the mayor foresees the 
auditors’ behavior and behaves in a maximizing way. In the event of corruption, we shall admit that there 
is no relationship between the parameters that are capable of leading to type I error. Even if these 
assumptions are simplifying, once again we are not critically interested in this decision point, but, rather, 
in the initial choice between being corrupt or not. 
 
  Continuing in the interaction model, we have: 
 
 




















  From this, we get two possible game matrices associated with the CGU’s different responses to 
appeals in the case of mismanagement: 
    9   








































  In each structure, the payoffs are circled for the mayor’s action that is the best response for each 
possible event that results from the combination of drawing and discovery probabilities. For the sake of 
simplification and to maintain the emphasis on this paper’s central issue, we shall use the “A” interaction 
structure, supported by the strong hypothesis that the relationship between the parameters is such that the 
CGU never accepts the mayor’s justification in cases of mismanagement. As a result, we find that the 
decision to appeal is a strictly dominant strategy for the mayor; once an irregularity has been discovered, 
the payoffs are made. 
  Let’s return now to the issue of the likelihood of discovery and the problem of signaling and 
credibility. If in the game’s solution by retroactive induction, the mayor does in fact observe π, then the 
CGU’s credibility is irrelevant. Alternatively, if – as is much more reasonable to assume – the mayor 
does not observe the actual likelihood of being discovered once an irregularity occurs, then the 
    10 cumulative credibility of the monitoring mechanism plays a fundamental role, since we define an 
observed discovery probability as a function of cumulative density on the parameter µ, which is nothing 
more than the cumulative sum over time of the signs emitted each time that the CGU succeeds or fails to 
detect irregularities. 
  The cumulative density function shown below is specified in the most flexible way possible, and 
it is used only to provide further detail of the nature of the interaction between the signaling associated 
with discovering irregularities, the CGU’s cumulative credibility, and the mayor’s decision between 
corrupt or uncorrupt management. 
 



















  For the purposes of analyzing interaction results, though, we do not have to consider the 
functional form of πobs, such that we may proceed with resolution of the game by reformulating the 
matrix in terms of the expected payoffs: 
 




















    11  
  An analysis of the CGU’s expected payoff structure reveals the relationship regarding the 
hierarchy of outcomes for the CGU, such that good administration is always preferred to 
mismanagement, and mismanagement to corruption, regardless of the drawing and discovery 
probabilities. It is possible to represent the mayor’s payoff relationship graphically as a function of these 
probabilities: 
 










































  It is important to evaluate a bit more carefully how the intercepts and slopes are determined. The 
end points of payoffs associated with each strategy are determined when p = 0 and p = 1. Subsequently, 
the slopes of each expected payoff line can be determined. It is interesting to note that the intercepts and 
    12 slope of the expected payoff of good administration do not depend on π, for obvious reasons; that only 
the slope of the expected payoff from mismanagement depends on π; and that both the slope and the 
intercepts of the expected payoff of corruption depend on the likelihood of discovery. 
 




















  Additionally, the way in which the slope of the expected payoff of playing each strategy reacts to 
marginal shifts in π is different, as Figure 11 illustrates. The important thing is to note that depending on 
the value of π, it is possible to have very distinct configurations with respect to the critical points of the 
mayor’s choice. For small values of π, a scenario is possible similar to the one presented in Figure 10, in 
which mismanagement is a strictly dominant strategy. 
 As  π increases, though, the fact that the lines shift in very distinct ways, according to the 
relationships set out in Figure 11, may create room to define two critical points, in order to define 
intervals of p (under a certain level of π, given exogenously) for which it is optimal for the mayor to 
adopt each strategy. 
 


















    13   Thus, for drawing probability levels during a term between 0 and p1
*, which is the same as saying 
a very low chance of receiving a team from the CGU, the best response for the mayor is to opt for corrupt 
administration. For intermediate probability levels, between p1
*  and p2
*, the mayor’s best response 
becomes mismanagement, since with greater chances of being audited, adopting corrupt management is 
very costly, but it is still worth exposing oneself to the risk of being caught and discovered in light of the 
gains that are earned from more flexible management. Finally, for probability levels over p2
*, the chances 
of being drawn are sufficiently high for good administration to be the mayor’s best response. 
  It is important to point out that the graph is not to scale, such that we cannot state precisely at 
what interval we ought to expect that the current level of p (given the current level of π), of around 
21.82% is located. However, given that cases of mismanagement and corruption are observed, one can 
speculate whether this results from ongoing learning about πobs (or likewise is the result of a natural 
selection process that is still incomplete, in the manner previously argued), or whether the choice of p, 
given π, is insufficient to surpass the mayor’s critical decision levels. 
 









  In order to induce BA behavior, p need only be greater than p2*, contrary to the common belief 
that selection probability must necessarily tend to 100%. But why wouldn’t the CGU set p = 1 and π = 1? 
Because of the monitoring costs associated with the increase. What one may find is that the inclusion of 
this type of cost may make it rational to accommodate MA as an acceptable solution. 
  A relevant consideration is what result the CGU wishes to achieve. Since there are no costs to 
determine p and π (indirectly from training personnel, funds for monitoring activities, etc, condensed in 
the parameter ∆), the hierarchy of outcomes shown above follows, such that the best response for the 
CGU is to determine p over p2
*. But if there are no costs associated with p and π, then the monitoring 
always chooses p = 1 and π = 1. 
  Since the analysis so far has been founded on this very strong hypothesis, we shall now introduce 
monitoring costs. This not only alters the CGU’s rational calculation in the hierarchical determination of 
the optimality of different results, as Figure 13 explains, a possibility discussed later on, but also raises 
the question of substitutability between p and π. 
 
4.  Considerations about the model 
 
  In light of the foregoing, if π is hard to change in the short run, from an initial π that is not very 
high, then it may be very costly both to invest the necessary ∆ to produce a higher π, which requires a 
smaller p*, and to increase p* in order to produce equilibrium at BA. 
  In this context, the optimal choice, from a cost perspective, for the monitoring body, is to produce 
a level of p* sufficient only for the mayor not to choose to be corrupt, even if he chooses to manage 
outside the limits of certain legal provisions. 
  Finally, it is important to discuss the role of other parameters in the determination of the mayor’s 
optimal choice. Since public policies may focus on these auxiliary parameters as a way of lessening the 
need for investment to increase both p and π, it is possible to have: 
 
a)  local checks and balances: better instruments to monitor local public policies, such as municipal 
councils, or greater media penetration, with informational implications for the voter, that affect 
the magnitude of the mayor’s appropriation parameter in the event of corrupt management, both 
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b)  instruments to publish auditing results: also essentially linked to the information issue, implying 
greater expectation of electoral punishment, and thus reducing the incentives for the mayor to 
behave in a way that involves risk. Additionally, it amplifies the effects on observed π, 
transmitting the effects more quickly of expanding investments on the oversight program for the 
mayors’ behavior; 
 
c)  imposition of additional costs: changing payoffs in order to make corrupt behavior more costly. 
Essentially, only having to return the amount embezzled might be insufficient punishment to limit 
this type of behavior; pecuniary penalties or incarceration would be ways of substantially 
modifying the mayor’s optimal choice; 
 
d)  the indirect effect of the judiciary’s credibility on the mayor’s decision: despite an efficient 
oversight program, if enforcement of punishment is weak, the effect on the mayor’s behavior will 
be negligible. It is fundamental that punishment ordered by auditors be fully enforced, so that 
incentives for corrupt behavior are not limited solely by the expectation of election returns. 
 
  The final objective of this paper is to extend the current oversight program starting with public 
drawings coordinated by the CGU. The expansion explicitly focuses on political variables, since we 
assume that many if not all irregularities are term-specific, in the sense that they are related to the 
administrative team that accompanies the mayor during his term, more than any other specific 
characteristic of the municipalities in question. 
  In other words, analyzing the oversight program based on public drawings, one might reach a 
false conclusion that only by increasing a municipality’s probability of being selected by the CGU to 
100% would local governments be induced to govern properly. The idea of certain oversight during a 
term would lead mayors to adopt good municipal administrative practices – at least in theory. What we 
conclude after analyzing the interaction model proposed in Chapter 4 is that a selection probability higher 
than  *
2 p  is sufficient to induce good administration behavior BA.  
 
5.  Dynamic Programming 
 
  We now develop mathematically the results previously sketched, as a result of intertemporal 
maximization of the mayor’s utility. 
 Let   denote the mayor’s instantaneous utility. Income may implicate 
utility through consumption; as the mayor’s savings are irrelevant to the issue at hand, it is without loss of 
generality to include it directly in his utility function.  
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where   ,    ,    ,   ,    . 
 
  Equation (1) states that the mayor faces a constant wage in each period, though his income may 
vary by his choice of corruption level. Equation (2) poses the effort level as a binary choice by the mayor, 
since all that matters is whether he is complying with regulation. 
  Equation (3) tells us that the mayor gains a reputation premium in either of the 2 dimensions 
whenever he is randomly chosen to be audited and (i) has acted according to legislation in each 
dimension, that is, has always made an effort and never chosen a corruption level different from zero, or 
(ii) has not, but the auditors have failed to detect it. Conversely, the mayor is penalized whenever he has 
not complied with legislation and the auditors effectively find out. Once more in accordance with the 
interaction model develop earlier, if the municipality is not randomly chosen to be audited, then the status 
of the mayor remains the same. Here, each period of time may correspond to two months, the time span 
between CGU draws. 
  Also, one important feature of equation (3) is that if the mayor has ever not complied with 
regulations, then he is penalized whenever his municipality is chosen and the auditors do not miss it. That 
means that even if a municipality has been investigated and no irregularities have been found, which 
would account for a reputation premium in the previous model, if a new audit takes place and 
irregularities are found, the new status of the mayor falls straight to  , instead of the accumulated 
payoff function. Moreover, in the present framework, if the mayor has been singled out for not complying 
with regulation in a particular dimension once, then it cannot be the case that a new random audit may 
alleviate his initial loss of reputation. This simplifies matters greatly, and also may be a more accurate 
account of how voters interpret audit results. 




  (4) 
 
 
defining income and effort as the control variables, and status as the state variable. 
 
  Let us now specialize the utility function of the mayor to be: 
 
    (5) 
 
    16   This functional format is handy because it is concave in the control variables and still implies 
maximization with respect to income independent of the interest rate - as it is associated to a CRRA 
utility function with coefficient θ approaching 1 - a desirable feature since we are not interested in 
modeling its endogenous determination. 
  Finally, by the maximum principle, we can redefine the problem in (5) as: 
 
    
 
where   stands for the expectation operator, since   involves uncertainty associated to p, the 
probability of being audited, and π, the average effectiveness ratio of auditors. 
  So, inserting the specialized utility format and substituting for the restriction in the objective 
function: 
 
     (6) 
 
  As income and effort are not defined with uncertainty, all we have to do is specify the functional 
form of  . We can rewrite it succinctly as: 
 
     (7) 
 
where   stands for the indicator function. 
 
  Thus, using (6) and (7), we can obtain the first order conditions of the problem: 
  









  (10) 
 
  Therefore, the mayor’s optimal level of corruption is increasing in his discount rate and 
decreasing in the reputation loss associated with being caught, in the probability of being randomly 
selected and in the average effectiveness of the auditors. In terms of mismanagement decisions, the 
mayor makes an effort if the discounted expected cost of being caught exceeds his (certain) cost of 
complying with regulation. 
  In the bottom line, this model formally states the results previously shown that account for p and π 
as potential substitutes, and strengthens the point that, were the penalty of being uncovered more than the 
reputation loss, the mayor would internalize it as an additional source of deterrence. This should be 
    17 emphasized at this point, since the model states that once a mayor has suffered a loss of reputation, his 
best answer is to choose a corruption level at infinity, requiring additional punishment mechanisms that 
either enter the mayor’s utility function or discharge him from the position of managing such decisions. 
 
6.  Application: Healthcare program audits 
 
  A relevant question in light of the foregoing analysis is the actual magnitude of the model’s 
parameters, which is the same as saying: what type of optimal choice for the mayor does the current 
incentive system associated with the oversight program determine? To what extent are the current 
likelihood of being selected and the perceived likelihood of discovery – along with other elements that 
make the magnitude of other parameters, and thus, incentives, dependent upon the adoption of each 
behavior – sufficient to limit corrupt practices or mismanagement? 
  Shleifer and Vishny (1993), analyzing corruption theoretically in developing economies, state that 
“poor countries tend to spend their limited funds on infrastructure and defense projects, where 
opportunities for corruption are abundant, in comparison to education and healthcare projects, where they 
are much more limited” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, p. 615). 
  The results for Brazil from the CGU’s municipal audits for the period from 2001-2004 challenge 
the view that in health care, at least, there are fewer opportunities for corruption. According to the 
analyses below, not only does a significant portion of municipalities show evidence of corruption, but 
indices of irregularities linked to mismanagement are also very high. The results dependent on the 
parameters of interest are alarmingly high, especially if we incorporate risk aversion to the interaction 
model, a highly plausible hypothesis foregone so far herein, which modifies the analysis since it amplifies 
the limitations of potential losses on the decisions of the incumbent mayor. 
  As such, despite a reasonably high value of p (over 21%, as we saw) and the reasonable 
hypothesis of risk aversion, the restrictions on the gains of undue appropriation do not appear so far to be 
sufficient to induce good administrative practices. Evidently, this may reflect extra-model elements, such 
as the legal system’s enforcement capacity of auditor recommendations in the event of embezzlement. 
  An empirical analysis, summarized from Biderman et al. (2007), and Lopes, Lichand, Biderman 
and Avelino (2008a, 2008b), indicates that 63.4% of municipalities audited during the period in question 
had at least one case of evidence of corruption. Moreover, 74.1% of the municipalities are shown as 
presenting at least one case of performance issues of the programs financed by federal funds, an indicator 
that has a direct relationship with the concept of wasting funds. 
  Breaking down irregularities by programs, it is possible to discriminate the main types of 
misappropriations caught by the auditors. The findings for the Basic Pharmacy program, for instance, 
indicate that 9.4% of the actions audited correspond to non-investment of funds; 11.1% to lack of 
medication; and 34% to problems controlling drug inventories. Even though none of these categories is 
included as evidence of corruption for parsimonious purposes, they clearly indicate mismanagement and 
are directly tied to wasting funds, resulting in the under-provision of public goods, in the case of drug 
distribution subsidized to serve the underprivileged populations of the municipalities in question. 
 
7.  Conclusion and possible extensions for future research 
  
  Given that corruption is a widespread concern, affecting governments and societies worldwide, it 
is important to treat it very seriously. Furthermore, because corruption varies over space and time, local 
solutions seem to be the most appropriate. 
  Brazilian authorities have recently set up anticorruption agencies and developed prevention and 
control strategies aimed at ending corruption. Subsequent years have shown that control programs have 
been successful in identifying cases and causes, but prevention is certainly less than optimal. 
  Even though the CGU’s powers include development of corruption-prevention mechanisms, this 
job has yet to be given priority. As such, we expect to contribute through optimization of the design of ex 
ante control mechanisms, using the public-drawing oversight program already in place. 
    18   The idea of developing a mechanism to prevent corruption is motivated by the proliferation of 
corruption scandals that have affected Brazil in recent years. However, we do not have the intention of 
discrediting the control initiatives that the CGU and other national agencies have already developed. 
Instead, this paper’s proposal is to extend the model being used, so that it also becomes a means of 
preventing corruption and waste of funds, with direct and indirect effects on the capacity of all levels of 
government to provide public goods. 
  It is possible to conclude that the imposition of 100% selection probabilities during a local 
government’s term is not only very costly, but unnecessary to establish certain ex-ante control: the 
establishment of theoretical selection probabilities over   is already sufficient to induce good municipal 
administrative behavior. A mathematical treatment of the interaction model allowed for a more rigorous 
assessment of the conditional response of the mayor’s decision concerning mismanagement and 
corruption to the parameter values. The mayor’s optimal level of corruption is increasing in his discount 
rate and decreasing in the reputation loss associated with being caught, in the probability of being 
randomly selected and in the average effectiveness of the auditors. In terms of mismanagement decisions, 
the mayor makes an effort if the discounted expected cost of being caught exceeds his (certain) cost of 
complying with regulation. 
*
2 p
  The idea of developing a theoretical model assumes empirical extension in future studies and 
expects new parameters to be reached in the practice of Brazilian municipal administration, assuring 
accountability and reducing chances for corrupt practices. 
  Once the model for municipal control and oversight has been derived, a future application of the 
model is expected at the state-administrative level, subjecting governors to the same type of restrictions 
that tend toward absolute conformity with the standards of conduct established by the CGU.  
 Empirical  findings
9 related to funding transferred for healthcare programs in Brazil from 2001-
2004 reveal significant levels of mismanagement and corruption among municipalities, at sufficiently 
high levels to compromise the provision of public goods, with deleterious regressive effects; that is, 
greater impact on the poorest population. Furthermore, an analysis of the leading healthcare programs 
shows that the incidence of misappropriation is concentrated on its main components, such as medication, 
making consequences explicit in terms of wasting resources and the relevance of developing mechanisms 
to limit opportunistic behavior as a function of the lack of mechanisms to monitor and enforce the 
investment of vertical transfers.  
  We strongly believe in the possibility that once mayors and governors are under constant 
supervision and control, prevention of corruption will become a reality, and governmental officials will 
tend to have incentives to be more responsible and to follow administrative procedures more closely, thus 
reducing the number of cases and amounts involved in corruption-related scandals, allowing for scarce 
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